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PRECEDENTIAL 
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_____________ 
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THE VANGUARD GROUP, 
                                                  Appellant 
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Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-16-cv-05713) 
District Judge:  Hon. Cynthia M. Rufe 
 
Argued:  June 14, 2018 
_____________ 
 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, CHAGARES, and FUENTES, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  September 4, 2018) 
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Stuart T. Steinberg, Esq. [ARGUED] 
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James M. Ficaro, Esq. 
The Weiser Law Firm, P.C. 
22 Cassatt Avenue, First Floor 
Berwyn, PA 19312 
 
Samuel L. Rosenberg 
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Monsey, New York 10952 
 
 Counsel for Appellees 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 In this matter, we consider whether the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”), 15 
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U.S.C. § 78bb, bars investors’ claims that their broker 
overcharged them and similarly situated plaintiffs for the 
execution of certain securities transactions.  The broker — the 
Vanguard Group (“Vanguard”) — appeals the partial denial of 
its motion to dismiss the claims against it and the denial of its 
motion for reconsideration.  For the reasons stated below, we 
conclude that SLUSA does not bar the relevant claims.  
Therefore, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 Vanguard is an investment services company that offers 
retail securities brokerage accounts to consumers.  At all 
relevant times, its website stated that Vanguard offered a price 
of “$2 commissions for stock . . . trades” for customers who 
maintained a balance in Vanguard accounts between $500,000 
and $1,000,000.  Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 86.  In May 2016, 
Alex and Orit Taksir (“the Taksirs”), whose holdings met the 
required balance threshold, availed themselves of Vanguard’s 
services to make two purchases of Nokia Corporation stock.  
Vanguard charged the Taksirs a $7 commission for each of 
their respective purchases.  Alex Taksir then contacted 
Vanguard in order to receive an explanation and refund.  
Vanguard responded by email, noting in relevant part that the 
Taksirs’ accounts “are not eligible for discounts for trading 
stocks and other brokerage securities because of IRS 
nondiscrimination rules” and that “[u]nfortunately, this 
information is not listed on the Vanguard Brokerage 
Commission and Fee Schedule.”  J.A. 88 (emphasis omitted).  
Following additional correspondence from Alex Taksir, 
Vanguard reiterated its position that the accounts were not 
eligible for the $2 per-trade commission.  Nevertheless, six 
weeks later, Orit Taksir acquired additional Nokia Corporation 
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stock in the same Vanguard account and was charged only a $2 
commission.   
 
 The Taksirs came to believe that Vanguard was 
overcharging sales commissions to clients meeting certain 
balance thresholds.  The Taksirs filed the instant lawsuit in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, bringing a putative class action for:  (1) “fraud 
or deception” under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 Pa. Stat. & Cons. 
Stat. § 201-1 to 201-9.3; and (2) breach of contract under 
Pennsylvania state law.  Thereafter, Vanguard moved to 
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) on two grounds:  (1) that the SLUSA bars 
both claims; and (2) that the UTPCPL claim fails for an 
additional reason, which is not relevant to this appeal.  The 
District Court concluded that SLUSA did not bar the claims, 
but dismissed the UTPCPL claim on other grounds.  The 
District Court denied Vanguard’s motion to dismiss with 
respect to the breach of contract claim. 
 
 Vanguard moved for reconsideration and alternatively 
sought leave to file an interlocutory appeal.  The District Court 
denied the motion for reconsideration but certified its opinion 
and order for our immediate review.  This Court granted the 
petition for leave to appeal. 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to SLUSA, 
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f), and 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We exercise 
jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b).  We review de novo the District Court’s decision on 
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a motion to dismiss, McTiernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 
526 (3d Cir. 2009), and “accept as true all well-pled factual 
allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from them,” Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, 
539 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
III. 
 
 Vanguard argues that the District Court erred by 
concluding that SLUSA does not bar the Taksirs’ claim for 
breach of contract.  The relevant portion of the statute provides: 
 
No covered class action based upon the statutory 
or common law of any State or subdivision 
thereof may be maintained in any State or 
Federal court by any private party alleging – (A) 
a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact 
in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
covered security. . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1).  It is Vanguard’s contention that the 
Taksirs “seek to do precisely what SLUSA forbids” by 
bringing “state law class action claims alleging that Vanguard 
misrepresented the fee that it charged them . . . to buy and sell 
covered securities.”  Vanguard Br. 7.  Thus, at issue is whether 
the overcharge constitutes “a misrepresentation . . . in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.”  15 
U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A). 
 
 The Supreme Court has addressed the meaning of “in 
connection with” in two relevant opinions.  In Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, the Court embraced a 
seemingly broad interpretation of the phrase.  547 U.S. 71 
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(2006).  It noted that “[u]nder our precedents, it is enough that 
the fraud alleged ‘coincide’ with a securities transaction — 
whether by the plaintiff or by someone else.”  Id. at 85.  More 
recently, in Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, the Court 
asked rhetorically whether the meaning of “in connection 
with” “extend[s] further than misrepresentations that are 
material to the purchase or sale of a covered security.”  571 
U.S. 377, 386–87 (2014).  It concluded that “the scope of this 
language does not extend further,” holding that “[a] fraudulent 
misrepresentation or omission is not made ‘in connection with’ 
. . . a ‘purchase or sale of a covered security’ unless it is 
material to a decision by one or more individuals (other than 
the fraudster) to buy or to sell a ‘covered security.’”  Id. at 397.  
Responding to the dissent’s position that the Troice rule 
improperly altered Dabit, the majority replied: 
 
[I]n . . . Dabit . . . we held that [SLUSA] 
precluded a suit where the plaintiffs alleged a 
‘fraudulent manipulation of stock prices’ that 
was material to and “coincide[d] with” third-
party securities transactions, while also inducing 
the plaintiffs to ‘hold their stocks long beyond 
the point when, had the truth been known, they 
would have sold.’  We do not here modify Dabit. 
Id. (fifth alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Dabit, 547 U.S. at 75, 85, 89).  The majority 
later continued: 
 
Although the dissent characterizes our approach 
as “new,” . . . it cannot escape the fact that every 
case it cites involved a victim who took, tried to 
take, or maintained an ownership position in the 
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statutorily relevant securities through 
“purchases” or “sales” induced by the fraud.  
Id. at 389 (emphasis added).  Thus, the Supreme Court in 
Troice made clear that:  (1) materiality is relevant to the 
analysis of SLUSA’s prohibitive scope; and (2) Troice clarifies 
— rather than modifies — Dabit.  Nevertheless, the crux of 
Vanguard’s argument is that the District Court erred by relying 
on Troice instead of Dabit. 
 
A. 
 
Vanguard first argues that Troice is inapplicable 
because it “dealt with an issue not relevant here,” namely, “the 
purchase or sale of uncovered securities.”  Vanguard Br. 19.  
Although the fact that the securities in Troice were uncovered 
was centrally relevant to that decision, that does not make the 
case inapplicable.  The Troice Court specified that it reached 
its conclusion, in part, because “a natural reading of 
[SLUSA’s] language” supports the interpretation that the “in 
connection with” standard requires “a connection that 
matters.”  Troice, 571 U.S. at 387.  The Court continued, noting 
that the relevant connection did not matter for its purposes, 
because the securities were uncovered; however, the Court 
recognized other reasons that a connection might not matter.  
Id. at 388 (noting, for example, that there is no connection that 
matters where “the only party who decides to buy or sell a 
covered security as a result of a lie is the liar”).  The Supreme 
Court in Troice did not limit its reasoning to the 
uncovered/covered distinction, and we will not do so here. 
 
Vanguard also argues that the Courts of Appeals for the 
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that Troice 
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did not supplant Dabit’s interpretation of the “in connection 
with” standard.  Vanguard Br. 20–21; Vanguard Reply Br. 3–
4.  As noted above, this is correct — the Court in Troice 
expressly noted that it was not modifying Dabit.  However, 
Vanguard is incorrect that this fact prevents us from looking to 
Troice for guidance.  Moreover, each of the appellate cases 
Vanguard cites is distinguishable from the instant case.  Each 
involves the direct breach of a duty that the broker owes 
customers pertaining to a securities transaction.  See Goldberg 
v. Bank of Am., 846 F.3d 913, 915–16 (7th Cir. 2017) (per 
curiam) (concluding that SLUSA’s “in connection with” 
standard was met where Bank of America took secret side 
payments from mutual funds that Bank of America traded, 
which should have been deposited in customers’ accounts, and 
did not inform brokerage customers); Lewis v. Scottrade, Inc., 
879 F.3d 850, 854–55 (8th Cir. 2018) (concluding that the 
standard was met where the broker did not meet its duty of best 
execution in trading securities); Fleming v. Charles Schwab 
Corp., 878 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2017) (same as Lewis).  
The misconduct in those cases was plainly material to 
brokerage customers, and the connection between the 
misconduct and the transaction was much closer than the 
connection between the overcharges and trades at issue here. 
 
In fact, the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits have concluded that inflated commissions do not 
trigger the SLUSA bar.  See Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean 
Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 615–17 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding 
that SLUSA does not bar a class action where the broker 
allegedly charged fees that were unfair); Fleming, 878 F.3d at 
1153 (noting in dicta that “a claim that [the broker] charged 
Plaintiffs $10 for executing a trade, despite a contract 
providing for a $5 charge, would not be barred”).  The 
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Vanguard brief’s citation to Fleming is particularly 
unconvincing in light of this example — albeit in dicta — that 
SLUSA does not bar a case with almost identical facts to those 
in the instant case.   
 
In short, Vanguard’s arguments align with the dissent in 
Troice — incorrectly asserting that the majority’s 
interpretation of “in connection with” differs from the Dabit 
interpretation of that phrase.  The Troice majority expressly 
rejected this contention; thus, we must reject it here as well.  
Vanguard’s submissions do not convince us to distinguish 
Troice, and in fact, the cited cases suggest that, under Dabit 
and Troice, the overcharges here would not trigger the SLUSA 
bar. 
 
B. 
 
 We turn next to the issue of materiality.  Vanguard 
argues that “even if Troice applied, SLUSA’s ‘in connection 
with’ standard would still be met” because the District Court 
misapplied the rule of materiality by (1) treating it “the same 
as subjective reliance” and (2) “ruling as a matter of law that 
no reasonable investor would consider it important when 
deciding whether to buy or sell securities that he was allegedly 
being overcharged.”  Vanguard Br. 23.  The Supreme Court 
has noted that “a misrepresentation or omission is ‘material’ if 
a reasonable investor would have considered the information 
significant when contemplating a statutorily relevant 
investment decision.”  Troice, 571 U.S. at 388 (citing Matrixx 
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 37–40 (2011)). 
 
 We agree with the District Court’s ultimate conclusion 
that a reasonable investor would not be swayed by the 
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overcharges on these facts.  First, the District Court aptly 
distinguished Goldberg on grounds that, in that case, the 
money at issue was material “because it amounted to a ‘secret 
side payment’ deducted from the plaintiff’s account on a near-
daily basis.”  This contrasts with the limited, non-recurring 
commission fees at issue here.  J.A. 60.  We also agree with the 
distinction that the District Court drew between the instant case 
and the “best execution” cases, such as Lewis and Fleming.  
J.A. 62.  We agree that, in cases where the alleged 
misrepresentation constitutes a breach of the duty of best 
execution, the “false promise to obtain the best available price” 
is material to brokerage customers, which is different from the 
incidental and low-value commission overcharges in this case.  
J.A. 62.  In addition, we note that the reduced commissions 
were available only for customers with at least $500,000 
invested in Vanguard accounts.  In contrast with such 
significant investments, single-digit differences in trading 
commissions are objectively immaterial.  Furthermore, as the 
District Court correctly noted, “a customer does not necessarily 
concede that a contractual term is ‘material to’ their securities 
transaction simply because they attempt to enforce it.”  J.A. 
67.1  For these reasons, the overcharges were not objectively 
material to the securities transactions. 
 
C. 
 
                                              
1 We have reviewed Vanguard’s Rule 28(j) letter on 
materiality, which cites two out-of-circuit district court cases 
in support of its contention that the overcharged commissions 
were material, and find the submission unconvincing.  Notably, 
both of the cases predate Troice. 
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 Finally, Vanguard argues that the Taksirs’ contract 
claim is impermissible because, although asserted as sounding 
in contract, it is in fact a fraud claim barred by SLUSA.  
Vanguard Br. 29–32.  In support of this contention, Vanguard 
relies on this Court’s decision in Rowinski v. Salomon Smith 
Barney Inc., where we concluded that “[w]here . . . allegations 
of a material misrepresentation serve as the factual predicate of 
a state law claim, the misrepresentation prong is satisfied under 
SLUSA.”  398 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
On appeal, the Taksirs emphasize that the overcharges 
are not the result of a material misrepresentation about 
securities transactions, but rather a contractual breach that is 
tangentially related to the securities transactions.  They argue, 
“[h]ere, a ‘misrepresentation’ is not that which ‘gives rise to 
liability’ on the breach of contract claim.  Rather, liability 
arises because Vanguard failed to perform its obligation under 
the contract, i.e., to charge what it said it would charge, and 
this precludes SLUSA’s application.”  Taksirs Br. 9–10 n.6.  It 
is not immediately clear whether Vanguard’s actions constitute 
a misrepresentation.  The website did not state that certain 
accounts are ineligible for the reduced commission fee.  But 
because Vanguard charged the $2 reduced commission on Orit 
Taksir’s second transaction, it would seem that the initial 
overcharges may have been in error and that the website 
correctly communicated that the Taksirs’ accounts were 
eligible for the lower fee. 
 
In Rowinski, we noted that “preemption does not turn 
on whether allegations are characterized as facts or as essential 
legal elements of a claim, but rather on whether the SLUSA 
prerequisites are ‘alleged’ in one form or another.”  398 F.3d 
at 300.  Because we have concluded that Vanguard’s conduct 
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does not meet SLUSA’s “in connection with” standard, those 
prerequisites are not alleged.  In other words, even if the 
conduct were a misrepresentation, it is not a misrepresentation 
that is material or adequately connected to a securities 
transaction.  Thus, the dispute over whether Vanguard’s 
actions constitute misrepresentation or breach is irrelevant, and 
Rowinski does not alter our analysis. 
 
D. 
 
In conclusion, we rely on the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in both Troice and Dabit, and we hold that the two overcharges 
of commissions do not have a “connection that matters” to the 
securities transactions at issue.  We note that the facts of this 
case are in plain contrast to:  (1) the breach of duties in 
executing trades of covered securities that triggered the 
SLUSA bar in Goldberg, Lewis, and Fleming; and (2) the 
fraudulent manipulation of stock prices in Dabit.  The 
overcharges are different in nature from these examples of 
fraud, and they were not objectively material to the decision to 
purchase securities from Vanguard.  Because the SLUSA bar 
does not apply, the Taksirs’ breach of contract claim may 
proceed. 
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Orders of 
the District Court. 
 
